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Come gather 'round people
Wherever you roam
And admit that the waters
Around you have grown
And accept it that soon
You'll be drenched to the bone.
Ifyour time to you
Is worth savin'
Then you better start swimmin'
Or you'll sink like a stone
For the times they are a-changin'.
Bob Dylan, "The Times They Are a Changin" Ist Stanza.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bob Dylan's immortal words echo the evolutionary times within
which we live. To paraphrase: If our time is worth 'savin' then we
better start swimming. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is
wading in waters knee deep and fast rising when it comes to what is
described in repeated news stories as a rising tide of backlogged
Social Security disability appeals.1  A change in the essential
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jurisprudence underlying hearings afforded to those appealing an
administrative denial of Social Security disability benefits is
necessary to remedy the single most pressing issue in the hearings
and appeals process-- the hue and cry over the pending backlog of
such cases.
The Social Security disability backlog draws political fire, raises
questions about the efficiencies of public service, and substantively
undermines the public purposes upon which Social Security benefits
are premised. The backlog has become a critical internal, as well as
public, measure of the success of the Social Security hearings and
appeals process. The backlog of such appeals is a direct function of
the efficacy of the Social Security global decision-making process.
At bottom, however, even a global change must manifest itself as a
function of individual decisions and, where appropriate, individual
hearings. For the individual claimant, timeliness in decision-making
is, apart from the decision itself, the singular critical measure of the
efficacy of the adjudicatory system. It is a measure which recounts a
tale of increasing workloads and resulting delay in an adjudicatory
system which annually addresses more appeals than the combined
federal courts.
That this is so is evident in the questions the current system now
raises. If the decision-making process becomes so delayed in its
outworking, does it not erode the very purposes for which the
program was begun for those who must wait? Hence, the outcry
against the disability appeals backlog. The answer necessarily gives
rise to another question - a challenge to think outside the box: is the
backlog able to be resolved by changing the jurisprudence which
defines the hearings and appeals process? Will a change in the
fundamental global decision-making paradigm effect a systematic
infrastructure change? That is, will a paradigm change reduce and
eventually eliminate the backlog?2
1. See, e.g., CBS News, Disabled and Waiting: CBS News Investigation:
Backlog In Disability Benefits System Leaves Thousands Of Vulnerable Americans
Stranded, Jan. 14, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/0 1/14
/cbsnewsinvestigates/main3712627.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
2. A famous Albert Einstein quote comes to mind: "Insanity is doing the
same thing over and over again, expecting different results." ThinkExist.com,
http://thinkexist.com/quotation/insanity-
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The answer is, unabashedly, yes. A fundamental sea change in
the jurisprudence upon which the decision-making process is founded
will operate over time to eliminate the backlog.
It is time to critically conclude that the jurisprudence underlying
appeals from the SSA, i.e., the way things have been done when
deciding appeals from SSA denials of disability and other benefits,
cannot meet the demands of a system whose call is to serve the
American people in a meaningful and timely manner as originally
intended by the framers of the Social Security Act. "The decision
model proposed by the Social Security Board was designed to make
an enormously complex program work at low cost and with
substantial public satisfaction." 3 In fact, as discussed here below, the
present SSA appeals system is under fire for precisely these reasons -
it can no longer provide timely decisions. It is literally plagued with
significant systemic delay resulting in widespread public
dissatisfaction.
The solution? A new, or, perhaps more aptly, a renewed,
claimant-centric jurisprudence to replace the now overburdened,
overwhelmed and plainly dysfunctional agency-centric
jurisprudence. A claimant-centric jurisprudence bears unique
hallmarks, distinguishing it from the Social Security hearings and
appeals jurisprudence of the past:
9 A claimant-centric jurisprudence empowers the claimant by
recognizing that a genuine dispute exists between the claimant
and the Government. It restores to the hearings and appeals
process a true Governmental presence in the form of an
advocate representing the Government, and by so doing
sanctions the claimant's status by conferring upon the claimant
equality with the Government who is also now a party to the
proceeding. This enhanced status effectively opens a channel
through which the claimant may directly negotiate with the
Government in an attempt to resolve the dispute prior to
hearing.
doing-the same thing-over andoveragain/1551 l.html (quoting Albert Einstein)
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009). The backlog has been decried for more than 30 years;
and repeated efforts have been made to eliminate the backlog or reduce processing
time with little effect. It is time to look beyond the efforts of the past without
ascribing blame, but with enthusiasm for new opportunities.
3. See source cited infra note 15.
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* A claimant-centric jurisprudence strips away the three-hat
fiction by which the so-called non-adversarial Social Security
hearings process is defined,4 restoring the administrative law
judge to the status of a true neutral, one unburdened of the duty
to develop the administrative record, a duty which now requires
the Judge to act as something other than a neutral. Instead, the
administrative law judge acts as a decision-maker required to
actively search for evidence beneficial first to the claimant and
then on behalf of the otherwise absent Government.5
* A claimant-centric jurisprudence reverses the current attorney-
representative-pay-for-delay incentive by which the interests of
the claimant and the attorney directly conflict. Under the
current disability appeals system, attorney's fees are calculated
as a percentage of "back-due" benefits.6 The interests of the
claimant thus diverge from his or her attorney. The more
quickly an appeal is favorably resolved, the lower the attorney's
fee. The greater the delay, the greater the back-due benefit and
the greater the attorney's fee. A claimant-centric jurisprudence
rewards timely, not delayed, resolution of appeals.
" A claimant-centric jurisprudence restores the Government (in
the form and presence of an advocate for the SSA) to party
status in the hearing before the administrative law judge. This
places upon the Government, not the judge, the duty to develop
the administrative record, thus restoring balance to the
jurisprudential paradigm.
" A claimant-centric jurisprudence envisions a paradigm shift
away from the agency-centric jurisprudence, which is the
legacy of the framers of the Social Security Act. The rationale
for this paradigm shift is fundamental. It is the Government
which took action to create a dispute (whether by denial of
benefits or otherwise); and it is the Government that should be
required to execute a duty to develop the administrative record
in aid of resolution of the dispute. This is particularly true in
disability appeals when the claimant is unable to afford the
resources necessary to obtain medical care or treatment. By
4. See Social Security Website, infra note 19.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1725 (1984), et. seq.
Fall 2009
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remaining present in the dispute through the appeals process,
the Government retains the ability to correct or modify its
decision, creating in its continuing presence a vehicle by and
through which the claimant may continue a dialogue with what
is essentially an opposing party. No such mechanism currently
exists, apart from screening procedures implemented by various
hearing offices to identify cases suitable for early review
because of the claimant's age,7 severity of the impairment,8 or
other dire circumstances. 9
A claimant-centric jurisprudence is adversarial, adopting the
hallmarks of adversarial interaction, including negotiation of
disputes in advance of hearing in an effort to avoid the delay
and expense of a full hearing. The current agency-centric
paradigm forecloses such communication, removing the
Government from the decisional paradigm and leaving the
claimant only able to communicate with a neutral decision-
maker who must, under current doctrine, hold hearings in every
case to reach a decision. In short, the current agency-centric
jurisprudence forecloses on-going communication between the
7. For example, engaging in early review of all cases in which the claimant is
over 50.
8. For example, undertaking early review of cases in which the primary
diagnosis is cancer.
9. Such screening mechanisms, such as the Agency's current "compassionate
allowance" project (see https://www.socialsecurity.gov/compassionateallowances/)
cannot, however, fill the gap left by an absent Goverment representative. No
mechanism currently exists for a claimant to "advocate" his or her case apart from
doing so in a hearing before the assigned administrative law judge and therein lies
the heart of the problem. If, for example, by reason of early pre-hearing screening
a case is identified as one likely to be able to be favorably decided, absent a full
hearing, what must the representative do if he or she disagrees with the date a judge
might, upon pre-hearing review, believe the claimant is disabled? Negotiate with
the assigned judge? How can a judge negotiate with a party without effectively
also becoming a party? Furthermore, if the decision-maker is a party, is not the
fundamental premise of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) thus violated?
These issues were raised by the petitioner in Richardson v. Perales, see source
cited infra note 20, but the Court found no infringement upon the APA in 1971.
The question now arises in a vastly different legal climate, rife with endemic delay
and replete with literal horror stories of claimants deprived of essential needs as a
result. The bottom line is that there is no advocate for the Government in the
current jurisprudential equation, and lacking such an individual, the judge may not
so act as doing so contravenes his or her essential neutrality.
SSA and the claimant during the appeals process, provides
virtually no alternative pathway for resolution of the dispute,
and thereby all but ensures that the overwhelming majority of
Social Security appeals are decided only after hearing. In such
resolution, the current jurisprudence all but ensures a
continuing backlog of unresolved cases whose decision will
take years to resolve.
In addressing the need for a fundamental paradigm shift in Social
Security hearings and appeals jurisprudence, this article explores the
present disability appeals backlog and documents its origins and
persistence in Section 2 ("The Disability Backlog - Nothing New").
It then examines the jurisprudential underpinnings of the Social
Security hearings and appeals process in Section 3 ("Retrospective
Overview of the Current Jurisprudence') and proposes a departure
from the old jurisprudence in Section 4,("A Renewed Jurisprudence -
A 21 t Century Jurisprudence), asking whether a new paradigm can
succeed in Section 5 (Conclusion).
II. THE DISABILITY BACKLOG - NOTHING NEW
To understand the import of the need for a new jurisprudence,
one must first understand and appreciate the nature of the backlog. A
backlog in the hearings and appeals context is an accumulation of
unresolved appeals, which, having aged beyond a certain point, are
no longer current and thus become a part of a pending backlog of
unresolved cases.
By definition, then, not all pending cases are part of the backlog,
for there will always be cases pending appeal. Rather, the question
becomes at what point does a case become backlogged? That
question appears to be answered by the SSA when an appeal is
pending for more than twelve months. That is, the question of
whether the optimal number of pending cases has been reached is
assessed each year. This is because the SSA defines a backlog as
cases pending beyond an optimal projected number at the end of a
given fiscal year. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
describes the SSA's definition of a backlogged case as follows:
SSA measures its claims processing performance at each level of
the process in terms of the number of claims pending each year and
the time it takes to issue a decision. Since 1999, the agency has used
a relative measure to determine the backlog by considering how
Fall 2009 The Times They Are A Changin'
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many cases should optimally be pending at year-end. This relative
measure is referred to as "target pending" and is set for each level of
the disability process with the exception of the reconsideration level.
SSA's target pending is 400,000 for claims at the initial stage and
300,000 and 40,000 for the hearings and Appeals Council stages,
respectively. The number of pending claims at year-end that exceed
these numbers represents the backlog. 10
Thus, one might argue that the existence of a Social Security
disability appeals backlog is not so much an objective assessment as
it is a subjective determination dependent upon the optimal target
number selected by the SSA. 11 From one perspective, the hue and
cry over aged and backlogged appeals may be a valid assessment of
10. GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, Social Security Disability:
Better Planning, Management, and Evaluation Could Help Address Backlogs,
(Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.vitems/d0840.pdf. Contained in this
passage is a footnote that reads as follows:
According to SSA, the 400,000 target pending was an estimate of
an optimal pipeline of claims. However, this target pending level
was never communicated to the DDSs nor were they held
accountable for reaching this optimum pending level. Also
according to SSA, in recent years DDSs have been funded to
maintain a pending level of 577,000 and have met this target.
Id. at n. 7.
11. Id; see also source cited supra note 9. Appendix I explains how the
backlog is calculated. See GAO REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS. What
is not said, however, is how Social Security reached the estimate of the number of
cases that should optimally be pending at year end. The GAO report stated:
SSA's estimate of the number of cases that should optimally be
pending at year-end. SSA provided estimates of the targeted
number of pending cases for fiscal years 1999 to 2006 for each
level of adjudication except for the DDS reconsideration level. For
DDS initial claims, SSA estimated the targeted number of pending
claims was 400,000. For the hearings level, the targeted number of
pending cases was 300,000; and for the Appeals Council level, the
targeted number of pending cases was 40,000. SSA used these same
estimates for each fiscal year from 1999 to 2006.
To calculate the number of backlogged claims at the end of each
fiscal year for each level of adjudication, we compared the targeted
number of pending cases at that level of adjudication to the actual
number of pending cases. If the actual number of pending cases
exceeds the targeted number of pending cases, then the difference is
the backlog.
Id. at 58.
appeals whose shelf life has extended beyond a politically acceptable
time to disposition framework. On the other hand, it may be that the
furor surrounding the large number of pending claims is, itself, an
artificial crisis, made so by the drawing of an arbitrary line and that
simply moving the line will end the backlog. That is, acceptance of
the fact that increased delay is a natural and expected result of vastly
increased filings and appeals upon a system conceptually little
different now than it was at its inception. Reality, of course, lies
somewhere in between.
For the average American, dealing with a Social Security appeal
becomes a personal issue, best phrased in terms of how long he or
she has waited for a hearing and/or decision. Court administrators
refer to this as the "time to disposition," while the SSA refers to the
time required to decide a case as "processing time." At what point
should a claimant reasonably expect a decision on his or her appeal?
Sixty days? Ninety? One hundred and eighty days?
In fact, the present time to disposition exceeds these numbers by
more than a factor of two.' 2 At the same time, the statistical evidence
is plain. Current dispositions of cases on appeal by Social Security
administrative law judges exceed all prior levels - judges are
disposing of (hearing and deciding) more cases than ever before.
And yet, the numbers of backlogged cases continue to persist. In
part, this can be explained by a literal meteoric rise in claims coupled
with a lack of key personnel at the hearings and appeals level.
12. See id. at 22 for a discussion of the statistical history as recounted by the
GAO:
Although SSA was able to reduce average processing times at the
hearings level in some years, by the end of fiscal year 2006, the
time required to reach a decision had increased dramatically. In
fiscal year 2000, SSA's average processing time was 274 days.
However, by fiscal year 2006, this average had increased to 481
days, with many cases taking much longer. For example, 30 percent
(about 170,000) of the decisions issued in fiscal year 2006 took 600
days or more; about 2 percent (12,000) took over 1,000 days. See
figure 10. Recently, SSA concentrated on reducing the number of
cases pending over 1,000 days. From September 2006 to the close
of fiscal year 2007, SSA reduced the number of these cases from
63,770 to 108.
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The current backlog, then, does not represent a phenomenon able
to be remedied by working harder, raising goals or adding more
judges and staff. Neither can it be resolved by tweaking the current
jurisprudence. Adding decision-makers other than judges, improving
the process, or like fixes avoids fundamental jurisprudential issues
which underlie the backlog. These remedial measures have been
tried and have failed. As the GAO points out:
Finally, management weaknesses as evidenced by a
number of initiatives that were not successfully
implemented have limited SSA's ability to remedy the
backlog. Several initiatives introduced by SSA in the
last 10 years to improve processing times and
eliminate backlogged claims have, because of their
complexity and poor execution, actually added to the
problem. For example, the "Hearings Process
Improvement" initiative implemented in fiscal year
2000 significantly increased the days it took to
adjudicate a hearings claim and exacerbated the
backlog after the agency had substantially reduced it. 3
The accumulated backlog, extending well beyond the GAO's ten-
year snapshot 4 belies the ability of any fix absent a fundamental
change in the underlying jurisprudence governing the decision-
making process.
That this is so is readily evident given that the backlog is not a
recent phenomenon. Instead, the backlog is endemic, making its
appearance as early as thirty years ago in 1978. For example, the
Report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs on H.R. 6975 on
the "Increase in Number of Administrative Law Judge Positions,"
dated February 6, 1978, is plain in its description of the need to
address the backlog:
The urgency of the need for extending the present
limit of 240 GS-16 ALJ positions to 340 has been
stated in letters to the committee from the Chairman
of the National Labor Relations Board and the Under
Secretary of the Interior, as well as in communications
from other agencies which employ ALJ's. They cite
13. Id. at 3-4.
14. See id. at n. 2.
growing case backlogs and the anticipated increase in
complexity of cases to be heard under newly assigned
responsibilities in justification.15
In 1974 Robert H. Trachtenberg was appointed as Director of the
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, as ODAR was then known. He
took over from H. Dale Cook, an Oklahoma attorney who was
nominated to the federal bench in Oklahoma by then Senator Henry
Belmon. In a 1979 affidavit before the Subcommittee on Social
Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means, Director
Trachtenberg wrote: "I viewed my role as being responsible for
eliminating the backlog, stabilizing the workload, reducing
processing times, all the while maintaining a system of administrative
justice which afforded claimants due process and assured quality
decision."' 6
Professor Victor Rosenblum, a noted administrative law scholar,
echoes Director Trachtenberg's assessment, commenting:
We realize, of course, that when Mr. Trachtenberg
came to BHA the backlog of cases was at an all-time
high and there were many demands from Congress for
speedier disposition of cases. Moreover, the pressure
from HEW has been almost exclusively in terms of
faster disposition of cases rather than case quality.
17
Almost 20 years later the backlog continues. In a hearing before
the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives on July 26,
1995, the Honorable Tom Beville, House Representative from the
State of Alabama stated:
Mr. Chairman, I don't know of much that I could add
to what the Chief Justice has just stated, but you, and
the members of the distinguished panel are very much
aware of this situation and I think it is one that is
15. "COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS ON H.R. 6975 ON THE INCREASE IN
NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE POSITIONS, at 3 (1978).
16. S. COMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 96TH CONG., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: SURVEY
AND ISSUE PAPER, at 4 (1979).
17. Id. at 5.
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critical. I think it is one that this panel, I'm sure is
going to streamline and improve.
We see these Social Security cases each of us as
Members of Congress, when we're in our office, we
see all of these people coming in, the disability claims,
for example where they've been trying to get their
disability for 3 to 5 years. I don't guess I ever have
visited in any of my three offices in Alabama,
congressional offices, that I don't see people that have
paid their Social Security, and the system is kind of
bogged down when they have to wait 3 to 5 years to
get disability Social Security. 18
History and the GAO assessment notwithstanding, the backlog
does not represent a failure by any group or indeed by the SSA itself.
The backlog is a creature of its own making, a byproduct of a
jurisprudential system whose function was well-served when
emplaced in the 1950s, but which has became incrementally
overwhelmed as the number of pending appeals increased in the
1970s and since. 19
18. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 104TH CONG. HEARING BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ON H.R. 1802,
REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY ACT, at 45 (1995).
19. In recounting its history, the SSA states:
In the later 1950's and early 1960's, the scope and complexity of
the social security programs had grown considerably. Social
Security coverage was extended to employees of State and local
governments through individually negotiated agreements. A
disability insurance program was initiated, providing for the
determination of disability by the States under contract to the
Social Security Administration. Both of these developments
placed some strain on organization structure, since they required
extensive contact and negotiation by field personnel with the
States, and they introduced into what had been a relatively
simple program a number of highly technical functions and work
processes. These new responsibilities were incorporated without
serious dysfunction, however, so that no major change in the
organization of the Administration was deemed necessary.
Social Security Website, History of SSA During the Johnson Administration 1963-
1968, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/ssalbjorgl.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2009) (emphasis added).
While the SSA declares on its website that "the scope and
complexity of social security programs had grown considerably," and
that no "serious dysfunction" resulted, hence, "no major change in
the organization" was deemed necessary;20 in 1979 its BHA director
was decrying the backlog and resolving to eliminate it - a
proclamation made by virtually every director and commissioner
since that time.21  This is a classic illustration of jurisprudential
inertia: for in all the years since the word "backlog" was first uttered,
the underlying jurisprudence has remained unchanged and still, the
backlog is targeted for elimination.22
Arguably, the essential problem lies in the jurisprudential
structure of the current non-adversarial adjudicative system. The
current system will backlog (as it has over the past thirty years) if it is
tasked with handling even a fraction of the number of current
pending appeals, because the inherent infrastructure of the system
fails to seek and employ maximal utility of its most critical players.
It is not surprising that the system fails to timely dispose of pending
cases, allowing more recent claims to stagnate in a growing backlog,
for this system does not routinely allow resolution of appeals without
a hearing. There is no mechanism akin to settlement in the courts
which allow lawyers to resolve the dispute without significant
intervention of the assigned judge.
Instead, the current jurisprudential system was designed
following passage of the 1935 Social Security Act to ensure that each
claimant had an opportunity to tell his or her story to a decision-
20. Id.
21. See sources cited infra note 25.
22. Of significance, however, is the Social Security Administration
Representation Project (SSARP) initiated in 1982 and closed down in 1986. A
complete history of the SSARP is ably set forth by Frank Bloch, Jeffrey Lubbers
and Paul Verkuil in their 2002 report submitted to the Social Security Advisory
Board, Introducing Nonadversarial Government Representatives To Improve The
Record For Decision In Social Security Disability Adjudications, which is available
at http://www.scribd.com/doc/1958851 /Social-Security-BlochLubbersVerkuil.
This report is also discussed in the following section. Note also, the Initiatives to
Eliminate the Social Security Administration Backlog as of March 28, 2008,
available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/806978/Initiatives-to-Eliminate-the-
Social-Security-Administration-Hearing-Backlog, which acknowledges the
continued backlog and a literal host of diverse efforts to address the issue; none of
which fundamentally addresses the underlying jurisprudence.
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maker whose charge was not only to ensure a full, fair and complete
hearing, but to act proactively on behalf of the claimant, assisting
him or her in the presentation of his or her case as necessary. The
decision-maker was, and is today, tasked with not only deciding the
case, but ensuring that the claimant has adequately prepared his or
her claim - a job normally reserved to a party and his or her lawyer.
In an era when few claimants were represented and the number of
pending appeals numbered nationally in the five figures, the system
worked.23 The underlying philosophy was to aid those who were
perceived as less able due to their age or infirmity. The
jurisprudence of the day, a mid-twentieth century adjudicatory
system, worked well throughout the twentieth century.
Today, in a vastly different legal and social climate, this twentieth
century construct has faltered and will continue to fail unless the
inertia of history can be overcome and a new twenty-first century
jurisprudence is enacted.
11. RETROSPECTIVE OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE
It is well settled that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
does not contemplate a single jurisprudence. "The focus of the APA
was not on judicialization but on fairness and impartiality in welding
administrative skills and responsibilities. 2 4  But such a simple
statement belies the significance of the radical philosophical
underpinnings of the adjudicatory system crafted by the progenitors
of SSA's adjudicatory system. Indeed, once the underlying
philosophical foundation is understood, it is not difficult to
understand why the Social Security adjudicatory system has persisted
23. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406, 410 (1971), wherein the
Court notes: "With over 20,000 disability claim hearings annually ... It assumes
too much and would bring down too many procedures designed, and working well,
for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity." With 20,000
annual appeals in 1971, the high Court described the system as "working well."
See id. Today, it is not.
24. S. COMM. ON SOCIAL SEC. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
96TH CONG., SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES:
SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, at 8-9 (1979) [hereinafter SURVEY AND ISSUE
PAPER].
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so stubbornly over time despite literally decades of evidence that it
does not function as originally intended.
With apologies for the length of the quote, I repeat here Dean and
Professor of Law Paul Verkuil's able summary of the emergence of
the new administrative philosophies adopted following the passage of
the 1935 Social Security Act:
It would be a mistake to assume that the New Deal
period was characterized by administrative
arbitrariness, as the 1939 ABA report incident might
lead skeptics to contend. But the procedural
innovations explored then were in some ways as
dramatic as the substantive. For one thing, the New
Deal introduced the concept of the administrator as
benign inquisitor. The Social Security Act of 1935
established what would be the most extensive and
enduring social program of the entire New Deal. In
addition to its substantive mandate, the Act created the
Social Security Board, which undertook to define new
forms of administrative procedure. As guidelines for
the legion of social security decisionmakers who had
to adjudicate eligibility and entitlement to the old-age
and survivors insurance program (and as time went
on, the disability program), the Social Security Board
offered a new rationale for the role of the
decisionmaker in the hearing process. In a 1940
statement, the Board discussed the values to be
achieved in an administrative hearing in terms of
'simplicity and informality' as well as 'accuracy and
fairness.' It referred to a social security
decisionmaker as a 'referee' or 'social agent. '25This
concept of the administrator as an agent for the public
(working to ensure that the program goals are
fulfilled) is different from the roles assigned to the
common-law judge. The social security 'referee' thus
25. Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78
COLUM L. REV. 258, 270-71 (1978). In the original, the footnote is note 55, which
reads: See, Social Security Board 1940 Report, reprinted, in MONOGRAPH OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, Pt. 3, S.
Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 46 app. (1941). Id.
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emerges with a role that is independent of the judicial
one.
The decision model proposed by the Social Security
Board was designed to make an enormously complex
program work at low cost and with substantial public
satisfaction.26 The scope of the inquisitorial solution
was not intended to be carried over to the civil or
criminal process. But it did signal the kind of
innovative thinking about administrative procedure
that would ultimately lead to the emergence of an
independent procedural model for administrative
law.27
The jurisprudential foundation underpinning this new
administrative procedure called for a decision-maker who was to
make decisions designed to implement programmatic policy instead
of one whose role was to administer justice, as that term is
recognized in traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence. The original
SSA concept of this decision-maker, then, was not as an independent
judge free of outside influence, but rather of a decision-maker
effectively tethered to the agency by the overarching constraint that
he or she follows programmatic agency policy, as opposed to
overseeing an adjudicatory resolution premised on an ability to
interpret law and policy. It is this philosophy which still, today,
colors SSA's view of administrative law judges and the decision-
making process. It is this cultural milieu which persists and
seemingly insists on maintaining the current jurisprudence despite all
objective evidence that it has failed to produce the originally intended
public satisfaction, or to operate at low cost.
Before exploring the functional resolution of a new Social
Security jurisprudence, it is important to note the views of
commentators and judges who attempt to distinguish administrative
26. Id. In the original, the footnote is note 57, which reads: "The connection
between the inquisitorial and social program decisionmaking is not one that is
synonymous with procedural tyranny. That model functions in societies with
democratic traditions similar to our own and its use has long been advocated by
administrative experts in this country." See, e.g., B. Schwartz, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 91 (1976). Id.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
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adjudications from those before the courts. At issue is a perceived
fundamental distinction between the courts and administrative
adjudications. This perception expresses itself in a deferential
judicial attitude toward agency decision-making, assuming, in effect,
that "mother knows best."
The problem with this view is now evident. The phrase "mother
knows best" is commonly accepted not as simply deferential, but as a
corrective admonition in the face of behavior soon to lead to
disaster.28 So, while the Court has framed a policy of agency
deference, the policy has itself created a seeming inertia within the
ranks of the agency, chilling fundamental review of jurisprudential
procedure even in the face of literally decades of declared backlogs.
That is, the SSA seems to have accepted the Court's view that "it (the
SSA) knows best." But as we now know, change is necessary
because even if resolution of the backlog were a question of working
harder or more efficiently the surge in numbers of claims has
demonstrated that even the most prodigious efforts, as have been
taken, will not succeed under the current paradigm.29
28. See, e.g., The Phrase Finder website,
http://www.phrases.org.uk/bulletin-board/35/messages/269.html (last visited Oct.
5, 2009). The Phrase Finder posts the following commentary on this culturally
accepted phrase:
This is a fairly common phrase in the UK. It's a portent of crisis
to come. So, perhaps someone at a party is drunkenly singing
ABBA songs while his/her spouse looks on with disgust. The
phrase would apply then. Any ideas about its origin? We don't
seem to have it on the site at all.
No idea as to origin, but very similarly ominous is the expression
'it's all good fun until someone gets their eye poked out,' also in
humorous usage here in the UK.
My grandmother applied a similar expression once to a pillow
fight. We thought this was silly, so we waited until she was out
of sight and carried on. Then in some sort of bizarre cosmic twist
I was badly scratched in the eye by the corner of a pillow. It just
goes to show...
It seems to me that my grandmother had an expression like that.
If you were laughing, she'd say, "You'll cry before breakfast."
Id.
29. The super parent is no more evident than in Dean Robert Viles' reference
to the 1967 Senate Report concerning attorney's fees in Social Security disability
cases:
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The genesis of the view sustaining the current jurisprudence finds
its roots in a time before the passage of the APA. In a case decided
in 1940, Justice Felix Frankfurter in FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co., commented:
Administrative agencies have power themselves to
initiate inquiry, or, when their authority is invoked, to
control the range of investigation in ascertaining what
is to satisfy the requirements of the public interest in
relation to the needs of vast regions and sometimes the
whole nation in the enjoyment of facilities for
transportation, communication and other essential
public services. These differences in origin and
function preclude wholesale transplantation of the
rules of procedure, trial and review which have
evolved from the history and experience of courts.3"
Justice Frankfurter draws a distinction between the courts and
administrative adjudications in that "in administrative matters, the
public has a stake in the outcome; that society's role is not merely to
provide a neutral forum for two civil litigants." 31 He further adds
that "administrative agencies must employ procedures that facilitate
The most important justification for fee limitations is that the
claimant is in some respects incompetent ... The incompetency
rationale is plain to see in the history of veterans' and Indian
legislation. The veterans . . . were early the victims of
enterprising claims agents. Indians exemplify even better a
group which assumedly lacks the understanding to bargain on
equal terms with a larger, alien society ... The argument from
expertise ... assumes that the claimants do not understand their
rights in the premises. This is because the situation is at once too
complicated and too simple: the law is too complicated to
dispense with the need of administrative assistance; and the
individual cases are uniform enough to make the application of
expertise relatively simple. Therefore, the claimant can trust the
skill and good motives of the government and can dispense with
expensive legal advice.
Robert M. Viles, infra note 48, citing S. REP. No. 795, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 6-7
(1967) (emphasis added). See also Donald A. Strickland, Limitations on Attorneys
Fees Under Federal Law 27-30 (American Bar Foundation 1961).
30. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1940) (emphasis
added).
31. Id. at 281.
the effective completion of public agendas; the procedures are part of
the public interest calculation that gives increased control over the
outcome."32 While Professor Verkuil sees this as distinctive from
decision-making in the courts, 3 3 the two jurisprudential views are not,
in fact nor in legal theory so distant. For the Anglo-American theory
of jurisprudence relies upon stare decisis (the creation of precedent),
such that a legal decision has potential to affect not only the
disputants, but society at large as well. Nevertheless, key U.S.
Supreme Court decisions during the 1970s gave impetus to the notion
that the SSA process is working well,34 and does not require change
when measured against Constitutional principles of due process and
fairness.
The affirmation of the present disability adjudicatory system by
the U. S. Supreme Court found its beginnings in Goldberg v. Kelly.
In Goldberg, the Supreme Court drew upon the due process clause to
require in benefits proceedings procedural rights akin to those in
adversary proceedings.3" While this might have been seen as
heralding a change in the jurisprudence in Social Security appeals,
any evolutionary change came to an abrupt halt with the 1971
Supreme Court decision in Richardson v. Perales.36 The Court
distinguished the Social Security appeal as distinct from the benefits
termination case in Goldberg, at once empowering hearing examiners
(now, administrative law judges) in the conduct of such proceedings,
while effectively sanctioning the hybrid jurisprudence adopted by the
SSA in its 1935-esque conception of its decision-makers as social
agents and largely continued as such despite the passage of the APA
in 1946." 7
32. Id. at 281-82.
33. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 258 (1978).
34. See source cited supra note 6.
35. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
36. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
37. Id. The Perales Court declines to address the question whether the APA
applies to social security disability claims, despite the claimant's challenge to the
multiple-hat role required of the (then) hearing examiner:
Claimant complains of the system of processing disability claims.
He suggests . . . that the Administrative Procedure Act, rather
that the Social Security Act, governs the processing of claims and
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Notwithstanding the APA's requirement that there be a separation
of functions in administrative agencies, the high Court approved the
so-called "three-hat administrative law judge (claimant
representative, government representative, and neutral decider),
whose conduct has been seen to emulate that of inquisitorial judges
in continental countries." 38 This strange-seeming role for the Social
Security decision-maker (at first glance, inapposite to the concept of
a neutral decision-maker as conceived in Anglo-American
jurisprudence) is an outgrowth of the original notion of the Social
Security decision-maker as a "social agent." That is, a decision-
maker acting at once for the SSA in effectuating policy goals while at
the same time acting to assist those presumed to be less capable of
acting because of lack of representation, infirmity, age or a
combination of all three.39
specifically provides for cross-examination . .. The claimant
goes on to assert that in any event the hearing procedure is
invalid on due process grounds. He says the Hearing Examiner
has the responsibility for gathering the evidence and to make the
Government's case as strong as possible; that naturally he leans
toward a decision in favor of the evidence he has gathered; that
justice must satisfy the appearance of justice citing Offut v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954), and In Re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955); and that an independent hearing examiner
such as in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act should be provided.
We need not decide whether the APA has general application to
social security disability claims, for the social security
administrative procedure does not vary from that prescribed by
the APA.
Id. at 408-09 (emphasis added).
38. Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 258, 286 (1978).
39. This being said, there has been no question but that the decisions made
and reached under this system satisfy APA requirements. As Professor Verkuil
writes: "[M]ore than half of all AL's - those assigned to the Social Security
Administration - decide more than 80 percent of all administrative cases in
distinctly non-adversarial fashion. Since these decisions meet APA requirements,
they demonstrate that even the definition of formal adjudication is susceptible to
radically different interpretations." Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
Here lies the essence of the current jurisprudence. It is an
agency-centric model adopting a 1930s worldview4 ° powered by a
1950s caretaker mentality in which the role of counsel is minimized
in favor of a strong agency decision-maker, empowered to ensure the
right result is reached. It evokes an image of the Government
reminiscent of the state in juvenile cases - the state as parens patriae,
or, super-parent.41 More cogently, it accepts as a procedural mandate
the public policy underlying the Social Security Act, expressed most
plainly at Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations section
404.508 which deals with waiver of an overpayment where
"adjustment or recovery will defeat the purpose of Title II." That
section provides, in-part, that to defeat the purpose of "benefits under
this title" means "to deprive a person of income required for ordinary
and necessary living expenses. '42 That is to say, the public policy
underlying the Social Security Act is to provide daily maintenance
and sustenance for those unable to provide for themselves. The
agency becomes the personified intention of the government to
provide for those who cannot provide for themselves, in real terms, a
''super parent."
Defining the Social Security decision-maker as one who looks
out for the welfare of the claimant by ensuring the record is fully
developed by the wearing of "Three Hats" is a direct expression of
this unique procedural mandate.43 In a jurisprudence described as
non-adversarial, where the government chooses not to appear and
instead imbues the decision-maker with its and the claimant's
responsibilities to present evidence, there can be little doubt but that
the intended role of the decision-maker is not so much that of a
neutral as it is agency facilitator or super parent. This is a uniquely
40. "The social security appeals procedure which was established in 1939
antedates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) which was enacted in 1946."
SURVEY AND ISSUE PAPER, supra note 24, at 6.
41. A doctrine that grants the inherent power and authority of the state to
protect persons who are legally unable to act on their own behalf, the parens patriae
doctrine has its roots in English common law. TheFreeDictionary.com,
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Parens+Patriae (last visited Oct. 5,
2009). In feudal times, various obligations and powers, collectively referred to as
the "royal prerogative," were reserved to the king. Id. The king exercised these
functions in his role of father of the country. Id.
42. 20 C.F.R. § 404.508(a) (1999).
43. See infra note 53.
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different role from that of judge in the traditional Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence. 44
In retrospect, the holding in Perales arguably did more to
perpetuate this jurisprudence than any other. Though the Perales
Court does not, in fact, require any particular form of proceeding, it
endorses the twentieth century hybrid model, breathing life into its
processes at a point in time when change should have been the
byword. So, while the world of Social Security appeals in 1971 was
still manageable it was soon to change with the passage of the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) legislation of 1972. 45
The Perales decision is bolstered by the Court's later decision in
Mathews v. Eldridge. In Eldridge, a pre-termination proceeding
undertaken by the SSA employed a procedure clearly less stringent
than required under Goldberg.46  In revisiting the notion of a
"flexible" due process standard for administrative proceedings, the
Court stated:
But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad
hoc weighing of fiscal and administrative burdens
against the interests of a particular category of
44. Indeed, such roles are not unique to juvenile jurisprudence. As one
website points out:
The doctrine of parens patriae has been expanded in the United
States to permit the attorney general of a state to commence
litigation for the benefit of state residents for federal antitrust
violations (15 U.S.C.A. § 15c). This authority is intended to
further the public trust, safeguard the general and economic
welfare of a state's residents, protect residents from illegal
practices, and assure that the benefits of federal law are not
denied to the general population.
States may also invoke parens patriae to protect interests such as
the health, comfort, and welfare of the people, interstate Water
Rights, and the general economy of the state. For a state to have
standing to sue under the doctrine, it must be more than a
nominal party without a real interest of its own and must
articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private
parties.
TheFreeDictionary.com, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Parens+Patriae (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
45. The law that established the SSI program was signed by President Richard
M. Nixon on October 30, 1972. See COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93RD CONG.,
COMM. STAFF REPORT ON THE DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, at 55 (1974).
46. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
claimants. The ultimate balance involves a
determination as to when, under our constitutional
system, judicial-type procedures must be imposed
upon administrative action to assure fairness. We
reiterate the wise admonishment of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter that differences in the origin and function
of administrative agencies "preclude wholesale
transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and
review which have evolved from the history and
experience of courts". . . The judicial model of an
evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the
most effective, method of decisionmaking in all
circumstances. The essence of due process is the
requirement that "a person in jeopardy of serious loss
[be given] notice of the case against him and the
opportunity to meet it"... All that is necessary is that
the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to
be made, to "the capacities and circumstances of
those who are to be heard". . . to insure that they are
given a meaningful opportunity to present their case.
In assessing what is due in this case, substantial
weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of
the individuals charged by Congress with the
administration of social welfare programs that the
procedures they have provided assure fair
consideration of the entitlement claims of
individuals.47
In both Perales and Eldridge the Court takes a deferential
position towards the SSA, assuming in each case that the
adjudicatory undertaking by the SSA is "working well;, 48 and that
"substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the
individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social
welfare programs. 49  These views of the agency have seemingly
fueled a kind of jurisprudential inertia, growing not only since the
enactment of disability benefits, but from the inception of the Social
47. Id. at 348-49 (emphasis added).
48. Perales, 402 U.S. at 389.
49. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 319.
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Security Act itself. It is an inertia born in-part from the fact that the
Act (and to a significant degree, the benefits provided there under)
touch literally every American, at minimum in the assignment of a
Social Security account number.5 °
In Eldridge, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Justice Frankfurter's
analysis, extending due process protections not only to regulatory
decisions, but to social welfare non-regulatory decisions as well.51
With the passage of the APA following World War II in 1946,
the new administrative procedures were seen as means to the end of
fair implementation of government programs and their efficacy was
to be measured by their contributions to that end. This functional
view of procedure argued for flexibility and informality along with a
recognition of adversary hearings.52 Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have failed to critically address this system,53 instead taking
50. Not to mention the fact that the Supreme Court, in ducking the question of
whether the APA applies to Social Security, reaffirmed the fact that it viewed then
(as now) Social Security procedure as virtually identical with APA procedure ("..
for the social security procedure does not vary from that prescribed by the APA.
Indeed, the latter is modeled upon the Social Security Act." Perales 402 U.S. at
408). This assessment cannot but have further reinforced the agency's commitment
to its informal procedure, notwithstanding the radical realignment of the hearing
process in the decades following the Perales decision.
51. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 283-84.
52. Id. at 275. See also Alfred C. Aman, Jr. Administrative Law for a New
Century, Province of Administrative Law (Margaret Taggart ed., 1997).
53. See, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) wherein the Court
noted with acceptance the hallmarks of the Social Security decision-making
jurisprudence:
The differences between courts and agencies are nowhere more
pronounced than in Social Security proceedings. Although "many
agency systems of adjudication are based to a significant extent
on the judicial model of decisionmaking,", the SSA is "perhaps
the best example of an agency" that is not, B. Schwartz,
Administrative Law 469-470 (4th ed. 1994). See id. at 470 ("The
most important of [the SSA's modifications of the judicial model]
is the replacement of normal adversary procedure by . . . the
'investigatory model' (quoting Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,
123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1290 (1975))). Social Security
proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the
AL's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments
both for and against granting benefits, see Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 400-401, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971),
a deferential view of a system perceived to be "vast" in its
outworking. No later case has critically addressed these issues,
leaving the old jurisprudence in place. Over time, however, the result
for Social Security has been less than hoped. Rather than a
jurisprudential system whose hallmarks are timeliness and low cost
with resultant public satisfaction, the current system has produced
backlogs accompanied by horror stories of need and even death while
awaiting appeals on applications for disability benefits.
No reasonable person can look to the current system and declare
it good. A new jurisprudence is necessary - one which recognizes
the radical changes in the legal milieu in which disability hearings
and appeals now occur. In short, a twenty-first century jurisprudence
in which representation is acknowledged and made a central focus of
hearings resolution. The cries of the many who now wait leave little
room to conclude otherwise.
IV. A RENEWED JURISPRUDENCE - A 2 IsT CENTURY JURISPRUDENCE
Frank Bloch, Jeffrey Lubbers and Paul Verkuil recommend in
their 2002 report to the Social Security Advisory Board that non-
attorney Social Security "Counselors" be introduced into the
decision-making process with "the express mandate of overseeing
and facilitating the development of the evidentiary record for
decision.' '5 4  With the greatest respect, in making this
recommendation they effectively do nothing fundamentally new,
remain fixed on the old paradigm and all but miss a vital opportunity
to take advantage of the radical change in the legal environment in
and the Council's review is similarly broad. The Commissioner
has no representative before the ALJ to oppose the claim for
benefits, and we have found no indication that he opposes
claimants before the Council. See generally Dubin, Torquemada
Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion
Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 Colum.
L. Rev. 1289, 1301-1305, 1325-1329 (1997).
54. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Income Sec. and Family Support of the
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 17-18 (2005) (testimony of Prof.
Frank S. Bloch, Ph. D.)
Fall 2009 The Times They Are A Chanain' 539
540 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 29-2
which these hearings now take place.55 Indeed, their proposal is
reminiscent of multiple attempts to tinker with the system while
remaining firmly wedded to the old jurisprudence:
55. Frank Bloch, Jeffrey Lubbers and Paul Verkuil propose the inclusion of a
"non-adversarial government representative" whom they term a "Counselor" whose
primary task is record development:
Instead, both claimant and SSA interests could be served better
by introducing a nonadversarial "Counselor" (described more
fully below) charged with the responsibility to assure the
development of a timely, full, and fair record for decision to the
ALJ... [W]e conclude that the best SSA "representative" would
be a non-adversary Counselor who could help provide the ALJ
with a timely and complete record for decision.
Id. at 72, 74.
In this, they fail to recognize the issue for what it is - this is no longer simply a
claim in an 'entitlement' system, but is, instead, a genuine jurisprudential dispute
between the Government and the claimant. The Government has denied benefits
and the claimant seeks redress. He or she seeks to be paid. The role of the
"Counselor" as described fails to empower the claimant by failing to provide a
Government representative able to agree to resolution of the claim short of a
hearing. The non-adversarial role, envisioned as one in which the "Counselor" is
trained to assist claimant in prosecution of his or her claim, does nothing new to
remedy the issues endemic to the backlog. It is the role of retained counsel - the
claimant's own lawyer -- to assist the claimant; just as it should be role of a
Government representative to assure the right result is reached, even if the right
result is a denial. This role is a critical hallmark of a Government Representative,
who cannot be simply an extension of Agency policy by which the claim was
initially denied. Such was the failing of the first effort by SSA in this area, as is
discussed, infra.
Under the non-adversarial "Counselor" proposal, the final decision is again
deferred to the Judge who must decide after a full record is developed. At best, the
proposal provides another helping hand in securing arguably necessary evidence,
but does not alter the fundamental jurisprudence. It does not remove the burden of
development from the judge; nor does it recognize the value of a Government
representative able to negotiate resolution of the dispute short of a full hearing
(whether or not non-adversarial.) It creates instead, an intermediate position aimed
at an intermediate goal: records development. And, while records development
remains an issue (As Bloch, Lubbers, and Verkuil rightly note, the failure to close
the administrative record after the hearing is a significant issue. This failure creates
a huge tactical loophole (and temptation) for representatives who are thus
encouraged not to submit all records but instead to hold evidence in abeyance as
insurance in the event of an unfavorable decision, submitting the same after the
hearing in hopes of triggering a remand)), the real issue is timely resolution of
appeals.
Management of the disability claims system and
particularly of strategies initiated to remedy the
backlogs may have also contributed to their growth in
some circumstances. In the last decade, a number of
initiatives undertaken by SSA to improve the disability
process and remedy backlogs have faltered for a variety
of reasons, including poor execution. Implementation of
these initiatives, therefore, has often slowed case
processing. Prior GAO work found that many of the
initiatives the agency has undertaken since the late
1990s were poorly planned and implemented and
yielded more losses than gains. In some cases, the plans
were too large and too complex and fell far short of
expectations. In addition, in 2001, the Social Security
Advisory Board raised concerns about SSA's many
proposed process changes and about the amount of time
Inclusion of a Government representative should be undertaken with this goal
in mind; and not simply to ensure a complete record. More to the point, the
claimant's representative is only paid if the claimant wins. How much more
adversarial can it get when viewed from the claimant's representative's
perspective? Why is a lesser role contemplated for a Government representative?
In an era when more than eighty percent of all claimants are represented, the
jurisprudential equation should be balanced by inclusion of an opposing
Government representative, charged much as a prosecutor is, to ensure that justice
is done and the right result achieved through the adversarial process. A prosecutor
represents the interests of the people and as such is charged not with winning, but
with seeing that justice is done. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935). In its zeal to create a system designed to ensure the decision-maker is more
akin to a social agent than a neutral decision-maker, the Social Security
Administration has lost sight of this fundamental characteristic of the American
legal system and in so doing has failed to include an actor whose call is not to win,
but to ensure that justice is done. Indeed, the only representative in the current
system is one whose call is to win. The jurisprudential equation cries out for
balance; for inclusion of a Government representative to counter the claimant's
impetus to win (at all costs?). Moreover, this should not be the role of the decision-
maker, for justice often times requires compromise and the need to negotiate - not
a role for a neutral, but for a "party," as is the Government in its role in the criminal
courts. That being said, the failings of the first SSA attempt, in which Agency
representatives routinely appealed favorable decisions, serving as impediments to
otherwise just results, cannot be repeated in order for a new jurisprudence to work.
The call upon such representatives should be as it is before the courts. No less a
higher call should be made here.
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and resources the agency had invested in changes that
resulted in minimal gains. Some initiatives had the
effect of slowing processing times by reducing staff
capacity, increasing the number of appeals, or
complicating the decision process. Some improved the
process, but were too costly and subsequently
abandoned. This was the case for several facets of a
major 1997 initiative, known as the "Disability Process
Redesign," which sought to streamline and expedite
disability decisions for both initial claims and appeals.
Various initiatives within this effort became
problematic. In addition, implementation of an
electronic system enhanced some aspects of the
disability claims process, but also caused some delays.56
The old (current) jurisprudence and its attendant assumptions
must be shed in favor of a new paradigm. A jurisprudence tailored to
the realities of twenty-first century law practice is called for; a high-
speed technologically advanced jurisprudence able to meet the needs
of a high volume social-welfare system now existing in a vastly
different socio-economic-legal climate than existed when the Social
Security Act was first passed and disability benefits first offered.57
56. See sources cited supra note 3; see also GAO Report to Congressional
Requesters, Social Security: Better Planning, Management and Education Could
Help Backlogs, GAO Doc. No. 08-40, 36-37 (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0840.pdf.
57. Reference to a "high speed technologically advanced" jurisprudence is
intended to mean: the SSA is completing the finishing touches on the launch and
implementation of what it terms the e-business process - a bureaucratic description
of a comprehensive, top-to-bottom conversion of the disability appeals process to a
wholly paperless electronic environment, including development of the processes
necessary to bring to fruition an evidentiary hearing of record founded on this
paperless, electronic environment. Implementation of the so-called e-business
process touches all involved in the process, from the state agencies, the claimant,
his or her attorney or representative and each and every member of the hearing
office (ODAR) staff and judges who must now receive, review, transmit and act
upon complex medical evidence in a paperless world. All well and good, an
admirable, if not remarkable achievement, but one which falls short of the ability to
accomplish the ultimate goal as originally expressed by the framers of the Social
Security Act: implementation of an enormously complex program at low cost and
with substantial public satisfaction. The e-business process is but a foundation - a
necessary foundation, but nevertheless incomplete, unless it serves to support a true
The United States Supreme Court in Perales cited with approval
the "advocate-judge-multiple-hat suggestion" stating, it "would bring
down too many procedures designed, and working well, for a
governmental structure of great and growing complexity."58 Would
the court today hold that delays in decisonmaking of between one
and two years5 9 violate fundamental due process, if not the public
policy underlying these benefits? 60  Would it look to the
jurisprudential revolution. To capitalize on this high-tech foundation, the SSA
must implement a jurisprudence which is also able to function at a fast-pace;
utilizing the positive attributes of electronic files and instantaneous
communications as a means to facilitate early decisions not necessarily founded on
the current paradigm which calls for hearings in overwhelming percentages of
pending appeals.
If e-business serves as a foundation for the old jurisprudence, one that sees the
vast majority of all appeals before administrative law judges tried in a full hearing,
the potential benefits of this vast electronic implementation will be lost. It can be
likened to passengers on a high-speed monorail whose destination is 50 miles
distant, forced to disembark and walk the final five miles because the high-tech
magnetic levitation monorail ended, replaced by 1880s railroad ties and spikes
astride a rickety wooden railroad station. The passengers must walk the final miles
to their destination despite their earlier high-speed run which they thought was to
their destination at the end of the line. The problem: the high-tech line did not end
at their destination. To reach their final destination, the passengers must now leave
the comforts of the high-tech, mag-lev monorail and trudge the final five miles. All
that technology gained is lost with the resulting delay as the passengers proceed on
foot, slogging their way across the final five miles. This is the current
jurisprudence.
The overwhelming number of cases appealed to administrative law judges
must be heard in a full hearing and no mechanism exists by which the appeals may
be resolved otherwise. When I refer to a twenty-first century jurisprudence, I speak
to a resolution of this dilemma - implementation of a jurisprudence which
recognizes that a genuine dispute exists and construction within the channels of the
surrounding jurisprudential milieu of a means by which significant numbers of
appeals may be resolved by agreement between the disputing parties, rather than
proceed in almost each and every case to a full hearing. No other adjudicatory
system now in place in the United States defaults to a status wherein overwhelming
percentages of pending cases must be tried in full to reach resolution. This is what
must change.
58. Perales, 402 U.S. at 410.
59. See, e.g., Social Security Administration: Agency Performance 69 (2006)
(showing the 2006 time to hearing disposition at 483 days),
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/finance/2006/Performance-Section.pdf.
60. More cogently, many U.S. courts have adopted Prime Minister
Gladstone's oft-quoted maxim as an expression of due process: "Justice delayed is
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"governmental structure of great and growing complexity" of 2010
and still declare that it is "working well?" 6'
In 1971 the high Court noted the "great and growing complexity"
of a case load numbering 20,000 cases nationally. 62 By 1988, the
number of appeals climbed to more than ten times that number,
totaling 289,281.63 Today that number exceeds 600,000 appeals. 64
In 1989 the number of judges ranged between 677 and 701.65 Today,
despite a more than twofold increase in pending disability appeals,
the number of judges has risen to less than 1100. The historical
solution repeatedly implemented to address increases in pending
appeals has simply been to do more work or increase the number of
case dispositions per month per judge. Judges have been asked to
decide from twenty-six cases a month (1975), to forty-five cases a
month (1983), to thirty-seven cases a month (1989) to between 500
and 700 per year (2008).66
Notwithstanding this solution there exists, and has existed, a
backlog, even though judges and staff have worked harder and done
more. (But, one must ask, if some 600-700 judges in 1988 were
unable to handle less than 300,000 pending appeals, how is it that
1100 judges67 -- less than twice the 1988 number -- can handle more
justice denied." ThinkExist.com,
http://thinkexist.com/quotation/justice..delayedjis-justicedenied/227920.html
(quoting Prime Minister William E. Gladstone) (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
61. Perales, 402 U.S. at 410.
62. Id.
63. GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. and Comm. on
Ways and Means, Social Security: Many Administrative Law Judges Oppose
Productivity Initiatives, 101 st Cong. 15 (1989).
64. Soc. Sec. Admin.: Plan to Reduce the Hearings Backlog and Improve
Public Service at the Social Security Administration, 4 (2007),
http://www.ssa.gov/hearingsbacklog.pdf. "Hearing offices have received an
average of over 564,000 Titles II and XVI disability hearing requests each year
from 2002 through 2006." Id.
65. See Soc. Sec.y: Many Admin.e Law Judges Oppose Productivity
Initiatives, 101st Cong. 15 (1989).
66. See source cited supra, note 41, tbl. 2.1.
67. Soc. Sec. Admin.: Annual Statistics Supplement, 2.72 (2008),
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2008/2f8-
2fl 1 .pdf (showing 1,006 judges in 2007).
than double the number of pending appeals?) 68 Clearly, the answer
under the old jurisprudence is "work harder."
The SSA has long struggled with the problem, attempting to fix it
with:
" "Better business processes,"
" "Improved hearing procedures."
" "Increasing adjudicatory capacity;" and
* "Accelerating review of cases likely or certain to be
approved. 6
9
The solution, however, lies in a new jurisprudence, not in the old
do more work or other attempts to streamline, make more efficient or
more effective already existing processes.7 ° Those efforts, no matter
how well conceived, planned and executed, have failed. Instead, a
new jurisprudence, one founded on a proven record of success should
be adopted. In doing so, the old paradigm yields to the new and a
fresh jurisprudence founded on the realities of today's legal and
social climate emerges.
This conclusion is mandated by the answer to this question:
What is the single most significant change in the legal environment,
arguably most likely increasing the number of disability appeals and
contributing to the backlog?
68. See id.
69. See Soc. Sec. Admin.: Plan to Reduce the Hearings Backlog and Improve
Public Service at the Social Security Administration, 7,
http://www.ssa.gov/hearingsbacklog.pdf.
70. The Social Security Advisory Board itself acknowledges this, stating in a
2006 report:
The third way to reduce backlogs is to increase production levels.
SSA's new electronic disability system has the potential to
increase production to some extent, but it is not a solution to the
problem of backlogs. The main savings from the new system at
the hearing level will come in the form of reduction of time spent
on data entry and file arrangement and preparation. In those
offices where these functions are causing bottlenecks, the new
system will reduce backlogs and processing time. In other
offices, the new system will simply move cases more quickly
into another queue, where they will wait for available resources.
Soc. Sec. Admin., Improving the Social Security Administration's Hearing Process,
12 (2006), http://www.ssab.gov/documents/HearingProcess.pdf.
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The answer is not a rise in population, though that certainly plays
a role. The answer is not increased societal awareness brought about
by new technology, though that, too, can be said to play a role.
Neither is the answer a changing economy, fostered by the
emergence the information age - though again, a likely contributor.
Instead, the single most significant change in this legal system (in the
jurisprudence of Social Security appeals) is dramatically increased
claimant representation and representative presence throughout the
disability claims and appeals process.
In all the reviews, studies, assessments and evaluations of
performance, efficiencies and productivity only the Social Security
Administration Representation Project (SSARP) arguably attempts to
focus on this increasingly prominent reality as affecting growing
numbers of appeals. 71 Even then, the focus was not on the value of
the interaction between a government representative with a
claimant's representative, but rather on the hope that a government
representative would hasten the process. In other words, the addition
71. The-SSARP ended with the U.S. District Court's decision in Sailing v.
Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Va. 1986). In finding that the Social Security
Administration's implementation violated fundamental tenants of due process
under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the court found, in-part:
The situation exemplified here shows jurisprudence at its worst.
An ALJ can only conduct an informal hearing; he is not set up to
conduct a court trial. He has no power of contempt. He has no
way of maintaining order. How is he expected to carry out his
function as a judge charged with developing the evidence when
the file is in the possession of a person representing the
government? When an attorney for the government appears
before this court and says that this case does not represent a
situation in which an adversary type proceeding has developed,
he is refusing to admit what the facts reveal...
By giving the file to the SSAR instead of to the ALJ it permits
the government a second chance to defeat the claim by new
medical evidence without the claimant knowing anything about
it. It affords the opportunity for the SSARs to go fishing for
additional evidence to support the government's position. In
essence, there are persons in the administration who do not trust
judges and in particular, do not trust ALJs and who want to
destroy their independence, and have used the SSARP and AlP
process to aid in their efforts.
Id. at 1067.
of a Government representative was viewed not as embarking on a
new jurisprudence, but as a means of streamlining the old, as set forth
in the SSA's own words:
SSA has decided to undertake a limited test using
special SSA representatives in connection with
disability hearings in selected hearing offices. We
wish to determine whether the participation of SSA
representatives will sharpen factual issues, improve
case record development and contribute to improved
quality, consistency and timeliness of case
dispositions at the hearing level.
During the prehearing stage, the SSA representative
may contact the claimant's representative to clarify
the issues in dispute. In addition, the SSA
representative may meet with witnesses who will
appear at the hearing. The SSA representative may
recommend to the administrative law judge that the
issues in dispute, as agreed to by the SSA
representative and the claimant's representative, be
considered as the issues at the hearing. The SSA
representative may also petition the ALJ to include
new issues, or to dismiss the case for jurisdictional
reasons or may ask that the administrative law judge
disqualify himself or herself when appropriate under
the regulations. On the other hand, where the evidence
clearly establishes the claimant's entitlement, the SSA
representative may recommend that the administrative
law judge issue a favorable decision without the need
for a hearing. [Emphasis added.]72
72. Frank Bloch et al., Introducing Nonadversarial Government
Representative to Improve the Record for Decision in Social Security Disability
Adjudication: A Report to the Social Security Advisory Board, 72, 74 (2002),
http://www.ssab.gov/documents/Bloch-Lubbers-Verkuil.pdf:
Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security
Administration, Federal Old Age, Survivors and Disability
Insurance and Supplemental Security Income for the Aged,
Blind, and Disabled; Final Rule: Project To Improve the Hearing
Process Through the Involvement of SSA Representatives, 47
Fed. Reg. 36,117 (Aug. 19, 1982). The regulations were initially
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The SSA's 1930s jurisprudential worldview and its subsequent
adoption of non-adversarial hearing procedures, in which the
decision-maker carries multiple burdens (wearing the so-called Three
Hats) was a radical departure from the Anglo-American adversarial
model of dispute resolution. It was a departure that makes sense
once placed into context. The SSA did not originally contemplate
that claimants' representatives would even be a part of the system.
As noted by Dean and Professor Robert M. Viles in his thorough
1968 Mississippi Law Journal article describing the SSA:
The original Social Security Act of 1935 was silent on
the question of representation of claimants for
benefits. In 1939, however, §206 was enacted with
the following explanation: While it is not
contemplated that the services of an agent or attorney
will be necessary in presenting the vast majority of
claims, the experience of other agencies would
indicate that where such services are performed the
fees charged therefore should be subject to regulation
by the Board [now Administration], and it is so
provided. [Emphasis added.]73
Even thirty years later, so few claimants' representatives were
part of the Social Security disability appeals system in 1968 that one
judge, whose comments are set out in Dean Viles' article, comments
that virtually no one is represented, and that, given the Three Hats
paradigm, it is his or her duty to represent all interests at the hearing:
Let me say this - maybe I can ease your mind. In
99% of the cases, people come in without any
representation. It is my job to represent those people
when they come in. It seems strange, but we use the
proposed on January 11, 1980 (45 Fed. Reg. 2345). That proposal
was withdrawn, after public hearings, in a notice published on
July 14, 1980 (45 Fed. Reg. 47,162). On February 18, 1982, SSA
published a notice reinstating the proposed rules (47 Fed. Reg.
7261) Frank Bloch et al., Introducing Nonadversarial
Government Representative to Improve the Record for Decision
in Social Security Disability Adjudication: A Report to the
Social Security Advisory Board, 72, 74 (2002),
http://www.ssab.gov/documents/Bloch-Lubbers-Verkuil.pdf
73. Robert M. Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers.
and Poor People Too, Part I, 40 Miss. L. J. 24, 59 (1968).
terminology that we 'wear three hats.' We put on the
first hat, and we represent the claimant, we present all
the testimony on his behalf, and drag it out of him by
questioning. We then represent the government, the
Social Security Administration, and search the law -
that's the second hat. We search our minds, and we
search whatever other records are available, we search
the evidence, and we present the best case that the
government has. Then we turn around and put on the
third hat, and we decide which evidence is most
favorable, and in whose behalf. [Emphasis added.]74
Viles takes issue with this paradigm and his criticism is the
springboard upon which this new jurisprudence takes form. First,
while the SSA and various courts have characterized these
proceedings as non-adversarial, there is little doubt but there is a
dispute. Lest the term non-adversarial be confused with a lack of
dispute, the nature of the dispute is evident: the claimant seeks an
award of benefits from the Government, the Government denies the
application, the claimant disagrees with the denial, the government
believes it has made the correct decision. Either the claimant accepts
the decision or a dispute ensues.
Resolution of the dispute depends upon a decision by a supposed
neutral decision-maker who, by definition, gathers evidence for the
claimant and against the Government, and for the Government and
against the claimant. Viles succinctly frames the issue:
The overriding difficulty for the Examiner
[Administrative Law Judge] who wears Three Hats
seriously is not the immediate and visible function of
asking questions in a hearing. It lies instead in the
ultimately impossible task of simultaneously or
consecutively building the best possible case for the
claimant by discovering, interpreting, construing,
organizing, and presenting infinitely variable evidence
most favorable to his position; of similarly making the
best case for the Administration, which has denied the
claim; and then of impartially finding a winner.75
74. Id. at 40-41.
75. Id. at 42.
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Viles calls into question the obvious: how is a supposed neutral
decision-maker able to effortlessly shift gears from one side to the
other as representative while at the same time occupying a position of
neutrality? More to the point, should the decision-maker embark first
upon his or her evidentiary quest for the claimant or for the SSA?
There is ample sociological and psychological study (which will not
be repeated here) which demonstrates the effect of first impressions
and creation of even unknowing bias. No matter which side the
administrative law judge seeks to examine initially, has he or she
then created a bias either for or against that party, or for the one
whose "representation" is undertaken second?
This non-adversarial jurisprudence and its underlying rationale all
but collapse in the presence of a claimant's representative, who:
If the attorney [or representative] for the claimant
would earn his fee ... should do his work before the
hearing. He must read the law; more importantly, he
must have discovered, prepared, and ordered the
factual evidence into a strategy of proceeding that lays
the factual and legal basis for the Examiner's
[Administrative Law Judge's] opinion supporting a
decision for his client. 76
When a claimant's representative appears, says Viles, he or she
"has knocked the Three Hats askew and revealed the proceeding for
what it really is."' 77 The hearing is no longer (speaking ideally) a
jurisprudentially balanced equation, with the administrative law
judge poised at the center, looking with equanimity at the claimant
and the SSA, secure in his or her neutrality. It now becomes
unbalanced. If the administrative law judge does nothing, balance is
lost because only the claimant is represented. If the administrative
law judge attempts to re-balance the equation by "representing" the
SSA, jurisprudential balance is still lost because neutrality is lost
when the decision-maker assumes the role of the SSA representative.
How can the administrative law judge act in the presence of counsel
and maintain neutrality? As Dean Viles so cogently points out:
76. Id.
77. Id.
[In appearing at the hearing,] the claimant's attorney
has knocked the Three Hats askew and revealed the
proceeding for what it really is. Either the Examiner
[Administrative Law Judge] responds to his advocacy
by treating it as a judicial and adversary process, in
which under one fewer Hat he moves to the no less
comfortable position of representing the
Administration and deciding impartially at the same
time, or he retreats into the decision-making
framework of the administrative adjudicator, for
which the Administration's rules, regulations, and
presumably the assistance which the Bureau[ODAR]
affords expressly to him, are desiged."
The skewed jurisprudential result is evident: treating the hearing
as an adversarial process in the face of a represented claimant, "he
[the Administrative Law Judge] is likely either to accept or to reject
the claimant's argument, without really setting against it an equally
well-advocated SSA case. '79 Or, by moving to the framework of the
"administrative adjudicator" he "simply fails to respond to the
advocacy." 80
As Dean Viles further points out, the consequence of making
such a choice changes the law to be applied: "If the issue is the
claimant's disability, the choice is between the courts' policy-
oriented law, which subordinates procedural [i.e., Administrative]
rules to the goals of social legislation, and the SSA's rule-
prescriptions, which obscure implicit but inarticulated policy choices
underlying them."8
1
An administrative law judge who wears Three Hats is thus
presented with a conundrum in the face of claimant's representation.
This dilemma all but disappears where the balance is achieved
externally, that is, by the presence of representatives for both the
Government and the claimant the judge is restored to his or her
Anglo-American role as a passive and neutral decision-maker.
Traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence conceives the role of the
78. Id. at 42-43.
79. Id. at 43.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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judge as distinct from that of the parties. Where the parties are
expected to be non-neutral, each advocating their respective
positions, the role of the judge is described as neutral - a non-
advocate, whose role is to ensure the integrity of the process and to
neutrally decide the dispute based upon the law and the evidence
presented.
Critically, the activity of each actor in the Anglo-American
system of adversarial jurisprudence is defined by their roles.
Because the parties are non-neutral and seek to persuade a neutral
decision-maker, they are described as jurisprudentially active; that is,
it falls to the parties, who seek to persuade the neutral decision-maker
and to present the evidence upon which that decision will be made.
The decision-maker, as a neutral, stands apart from the parties and is
described as jurisprudentially passive; that is, he or she is the
recipient of the evidence, which must be balanced in accord with the
law, but he or she is also not a source of the evidence.
FaIl 2009 The Times They Are A Changin'




Repleseitatives ae Non-neutr al and "Active"
Figure 1
The Anglo-American jurisprudential model avoids the pitfalls of
the inherently flawed non-adversarial single-party hearings model
adopted by the SSA. The question becomes why should the Anglo-
American model be adopted? The answer is historically obvious.
Though the SSA originally envisioned an administrative appeals
process without claimants' representatives, claimants' representatives
are integrally a part of the extant system and have been for decades.
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Despite this, no change has been made to the jurisprudence of the
system and it exists essentially as it has from the beginning.
Notwithstanding the judge's observation in 1968 that in "99% of
the cases, people come in without any representation,"8 2 the actual
statistics cited by Dean Viles are that "[b]etween January 1966 and
July 1967 claimants were represented by attorneys in about 19% of
the cases decided by Hearing Examiners."83
In fiscal year 2006, a September 2007 report by SSA's GIG
shows that of the 559,000 claims heard by administrative law judges,
439,000 were represented by attorney and non-attorney
representatives, representing claimants in almost 80% of all claims
appealed.814 Examined another wvay, the 01G notes, -[fin FY 2006,
approximately 26,000 attorneys and 5,000 non-attorneys represented
claimants before WDAR."- In a period ofl fty(it years thie statistics
,'IlpJCSOns. xr t"peetdi 1968, by 20060% of" adlilpesn
The unique change in the Social Security disability appeals legal
environment is the presence of claimant's representatives in at least
80% of all hearings before Social Security administrative law judges.
It is thus no longer likely that the 1968 administrative law judge
will have a claimant before him or her who is unrepresented. Instead,
it is far more likely - by a significant percentage - that a claimant
will appear with representation.86 And, therein lies Dean Viles'
conundrum.
82. See source cited supra note 62.
83. Robert M. Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers..
and Poor People Too, Part II, 40 Miss. L. J. 25, 74-75 n. 327 (1968).
84. See Social Security Administration's website,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A- 12-07-17057.pdf.
85. Id. at note 3.
86. That such representation is prevalent is readily obvious in today's society.
For example, entering "social security attorney" in the Google search engine
produced 125,000,000 results. Logging onto the National Organization of Social
Security Claimant's Representatives (www.NOSSCR.org) shows a membership
ot"3,900 attorneys and other advocates with an '800' number by which referrals
can be made to members. Numerous television advertisements are aired each
month for both local representatives as well as so-called national firms, such as
Allsup (www.allsup.com) and Binder & Binder (www.binderandbinder.com),
among others.
The present system was clearly designed for 1) far fewer (by
orders of magnitude) appeals hearings than now exist; and 2)
hearings without representatives.
The present Social Security disability appeals system now looks
very much like the legal system, where the overwhelming majority of
all persons (on both sides of civil and criminal cases) are represented.
It is axiomatic in the judicial system (the so-called "Third Branch")
that all but a small percentage of cases filed are actually tried.87
Review of disability appeals decisions, show at the hearing level and
above, 75.4% of all cases are "allowed - most after hearing."88
Why is it then that in the Social Security disability appeals
system, an overwhelming number of cases are decided after a
hearing, and given the high percentage of representation, not before?
The answer: the persistence of a jurisprudence whose model cannot
take advantage of the presence of claimants' representatives in the
hearings process.
A new jurisprudence will model the successful Anglo-American
system of Jurisprudence where the presence of opposing counsel
contributes to ies:-ohition of most ca-iscs before tiLResolution of
most disability appels er ttil~d%,IIsgniicantl reduce the
baclog:
The old jurisprudence is agency-centric- driven by an agency
impetus to intervene as super parent, effectively forcing the claimant,
whether or not represented, to a full hearing before a decision is
reached. It is the agency, and not the claimant, who sets the time and
pace for case resolution. No matter how eager a claimant is to
resolve his or her appeal; no matter how diligent a claimant's
representative might be; no matter how deserving; the claimant must
board the slow train with all the others, waiting while the SSA plods
through the line, 89 oldest case first.9° This requirement mandates a
87. See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go To Trial?: An Empirical Study
of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 317, n. 2 (1999).




89. Russians still tell this joke: A man walks down the street and sees a long
line. He asks the people in the back what the line is for. "We don't know," they
reply, "but it's sure to be something we need." As recounted on the following
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complex pattern of steps leading to a hearing, including case
development and scheduling, coordinating the schedules of judges,
medical experts, vocational experts, availability of hearing rooms,
hearing reporters and other considerations, with an attendant
synergistic delay. This results in delay not only by reason of the
many steps necessary to bring an individual case to hearing, but also
as a result of the burden placed upon otherwise overworked staff
members to handle the weight of many such cases.





The new jurisprudence is claimant-centric; designed to place the
impetus on moving an appeal forward on the claimant. If the
claimant's representative can marshal the evidence and, without the
need to invoke the complex processes necessary for a formal hearing,
establish a basis for resolution of the case with Government opposing
website: OffBeatTravel.com website, Waiting on Line for the Terry to Sakhalin,
http://www.offbeattravel.com/lines-russian-life.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2009 ).
The question here as in the joke -- why the line?
90. There are, of course, exceptions. "Critical Cases" are described at
HALLEX (Hearing Appeals and Litigation Law Manual) 1-2-1-40 and include
'TERI' cases ("terminal illness") and 'CAL' cases ("compassionate allowances")
among others targeted for expedited handling. HALLEX is the SSA's
interpretation of its own regulations; and is not otherwise binding on the Courts.
See Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OPHome/hallex/hallex.html.
counsel, the case can be resolved by submission of an agreed order to
the assigned judge and all of the intervening steps which now slow
the time to disposition all but disappear, as does the backlog.
An agency-centric jurisprudence is imbalanced, lacking
government representation. It functions only at the pace established
by agency processes and procedures. The current SSA hearing
procedure functions in essentially one mode and despite newly
implemented electronic business processes, high-speed computers
and vast electronic databases, employs a dispute resolution procedure
at the hearings level which allows virtually only one path towards
resolution - the hearing. As such, it is akin to a racecar on a child's
racetrack, limited in speed by a governor and only able to traverse the
track in a pre-determined groove.91
91. Of course, there are other paths, but they pale statistically in comparison.
Various initiatives have surfaced over the years, including the Quick Disability
Determination Process (QDD). See, e.g., Agency Challenges, available at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/finance/2006/Agency Challenges.pdf.
Agency-Centric Procedures
Create an Imbalance Allowing
Only a Single Pathway to Decision
Figure 3
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When faced with similar delays and backlogs, the federal courts
turned to alternative measures, recognizing that increasing delays in
civil litigation were tantamount to denial of access to the courthouse
itself. The Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) 92 was passed in August
1990 "to promote for all citizens, rich or poor, individual or
corporation, plaintiff or defendant, the just, speedy and inexpensive
resolution of civil disputes in our Nation's Federal courts." 93  The
CJRA led to the eventual passage of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998, found at 28 U.S.C. §§651 - 658.
It requires courts to implement their own ADR
programs. To 'encourage and promote use of ADR,'
the Act directs each district court to 'devise and
implement' by local rule 'its own' program (§65 1(b)).
In effect, courts must establish a structure for
providing ADR services, intended by Congress,
perhaps, to make access to ADR a practical reality.9
4
Alternative dispute resolution enactments opened up multiple
avenues for dispute resolution, empowering attorneys to resolve
disputes without resorting to the formal processes of the courts.
Attorneys are free to initiate negotiation, mediation and arbitral
remedies in various forms and at various stages of the dispute before
a formal lawsuit has been filed and at any point during the pendency
of such actions. These processes provide what is lacking in the
Social Security appeals mechanism: alternative avenues for
resolution of the dispute able to be initiated at the claimant's behest
and as he or she desires. Adoption of similar procedures, embracing
the reality that what is at issue is, in fact, a dispute, frees the claimant
from the rigid hearings procedures now binding the disability appeals
process.
92. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471-482.
93. S. Rep. No. 101-416; see, Civil Justice Reform Act, available at
http://law.jrank.org/pages/5238/Civil-Procedure-Civil-Justice-Reform-Act-
1990.html.
94. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Seeds of Change in the
Federal District Courts, available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KISADRMedTrends99-
00_98ActPub.pdf (last accessed on Oct. 5, 2009).
A critical attribute of a claimant-centered jurisprudence is revival
of the SSARP, albeit in a different form. The following attributes are
critical to this new jurisprudence:
A. A Dispute
B. A Government Representative
A government attorney, ei tiate with claimant's
C. Dissolution of the Three-Hat Paradigm
A transfer of the obligation to fully look into the case from the
administrative law judge to the Government, and specifically to the
government attorney, being transformed into a duty to assist the
claimant in the development of the record where there is a
demonstrated need for such assistance.
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the dispute is submitted to the administrative law judge for decision
D. The Administrative Law Judge as a Neutral and Passive
Decision-Maker
E. Social Security Disability Appeals are Adversarial
Given recognition of the existence of a true dispute and the
demise of the Three Hat jurisprudence, a further recognition that
95. A disability determination under governing Social Security
Administration regulations looks to a five-step sequential analysis as set forth at 20
C.F.R. §404.1520 et. seq. The claimant bears the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence at Steps 1-4, essentially demonstrating that he or she
has not worked during the claimed period of disability, in fact has a demonstrable
medical impairment and suffers such significant limitations of function (either
exertional, non-exertional or both) that he or she can no longer engage in work
performed during the past fifteen years. Once this burden is satisfied the burden
then shifts to the commissioner to show - again by a preponderance of the evidence
- that despite the claimant's impairments and resulting limitations he or she can
nevertheless perform other, less demanding work which exists in significant
numbers in the national or regional economies.
96. Typically, vocational testimony is necessary to establish either the
claimant's capability to perform both his or her past relevant work, or other, less
demanding work, depending on the nature and extent of proven limitations of
function. Under the current jurisprudence it is the judge who calls the vocational
expert and who engages in the initial solicitation of the expert's opinion.
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F. A New Jurisprudence Encourages Agreed- Upon and Negotiated
Decisions
Where the parties have reached agreement on resolution and
G. Full or Abbreviated Hearings are Held only in Cases Genuinely
Disputed
Where the parties cannot agree on resolution, a hearing may be
held wherein all issues are to be decided; or, where the parties cannot
H. Abolish the Current Pay-for-Delay Attorney's Fee System
Finallv the current renresentative-centered incentive-for-delay
97. Some hearing offices have initiated what is termed "OTR [on-the-record]
Review" whereby selected cases are reviewed in advance by an attorney or
paralegal to determine whether a favorable decision may be reached early on.
These procedures are not, however, widespread, nor are they calculated to bring
such scrutiny to bear on all pending appeals.
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with speed and resolution." For example, on June 22, 2009, the
maximum fee allowable under a fee agreement increased to $6,000 -
obtainable as the maximum allowed fee applying the rule that fees
are limited to 25% of back-due-benefits or $6000 whichever is less.
Delay in resolution is thus of benefit to the representative whose fee
increases as the claimant's back-due benefit increases, but is clearly
contrary to the desires of the claimant (who obviously seeks as rapid
98. As Dean Viles points out, there was evidence even 40 years ago that
representatives encouraged delay in order to maximize fees:
It was not unusual for an attorney purposefully to attempt to
manage his client's claim so that it would be denied
administratively, authorizing an action for judicial review which,
if successful, would permit collection of the fee for which he had
obtained his client's agreement. The necessary delay in pursuing
the claim through administrative denials into court would
incidentally sweeten the pot of accumulated benefits with which
the size of the fee varied.
Robert M. Viles, "The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers... and
Poor People Too, Part I, "40 Miss. L. J. 25, 62 (1968).
V. CONCLUSION
Why will such a system work? The answers seem clear.
Inclusion of a Government attorney/representative in an adversarial
milieu creates a jurisprudential balance, forcing the Government to
actively participate in resolution of the dispute which it created by
reason of its initial denial, while at the same time empowering the
claimant by returning to him or her a channel through which he can
communicate directly with the party who initially denied his claim -
the Government. The claimant, who is today overwhelmingly
represented by counsel, may then seek to negotiate resolution of his
or her claim with an opposing attorney/representative and may do so
when he or she believes there is sufficient evidence to open those
talks.
The claimant will no longer be bound to a hearing schedule
jammed with literally hundreds, if not thousands of others also
waiting. As noted earlier, statistics show a significant reversal rate at
the hearings level now, clearly signifying a positive potential for
early resolution. There is no need to recount here the hundreds of
news stories now circulating decrying the delay in resolution of
claims. Freeing claimants from a single track to resolution and
empowering them to pursue resolution in a negotiated fashion holds
significant potential for reducing and ultimately ending the backlog.
For those who might decry the adversarial system, believing it
will somehow subject claimants to unnecessary cross-examination,
one need only turn to today's system. One representative described it
thusly:
When I go into a hearing with my client I feel like I'm running
out onto a football field to play the Big Game. My team runs out and
the crowd cheers loudly! We eagerly turn and await the opposing
team to take the field. The crowd roars as the other team bursts onto
the playing field. My stomach drops as I see their uniforms, for each
one is dressed in a Referee's jersey.99
A claimant in today's system is subject to examination by a
lawyer wearing a black robe. Which is worse? What does the
claimants' representative do when he or she feels the 'other
examiner' has asked an improper question? Object? To whom?
99. Attributed to Mr. Chris Carr, Claimant's Advocate, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
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Returning the Social Security disability appeals system to its
Anglo-American roots recognizes that the fundamental premises
upon which it was originally conceived are no longer valid. The
Social Security Act of 1935 originally made no provision for
representation of claimants and its legislative history clearly shows
that its framers did not believe legal counsel was necessary. The
formulation of a jurisprudence designed around those seeking
assistance without benefit of representation was appropriate 40 to 50
years ago when every claimant appealing a denial could be heard in a
timely fashion. As the number of claims rose, and as the number of
persons represented also rose, the number of appeals rose as well.
By definition, lawyers are skeptics. They are trained in the
Langdellian method of legal study: 00 to examine the many sides of a
given issue and not accept any premise as true absent evidence. The
increase in claimant's representatives resulted in 1) an increase in
claims; 2) an increase in appeals; and ultimately 3) an increase in
delay. In 1971, the Supreme Court declared the Social Security
disability appeals system to be working well and noted only 20,000
pending claims nationally. Dean Viles points out in his 1968
Mississippi Law Journal article that only 19% of all claimants were
then represented. With 80% of 20,000 persons unrepresented, the
system worked well.
With an increase in representation came an increase in appeals.
Claimants' representatives, the majority of whom were lawyers, were
unwilling to accept the SSA's determination without an in-person
appeal. After all, it is an American truism that 'everyone deserves
their day in court.' As benefits improved and fees increased, claims
100. Dean Langdell's greatest innovation was his introduction of the case
method of instruction. Until 1890, no other U.S. law school used this method,
which is now standard. Moreover, the standard first-year curriculum at all
American law schools - Contracts, Property, Torts, Criminal Law, and Civil
Procedure - stands, mostly unchanged, from the curriculum Langdell instituted.
Langdell, who came from a relatively unknown family, was conscious of the fact
that students from more privileged backgrounds often received higher grades in
their coursework purely because of their family's wealth and social status. Dean
Langdell instituted the process of blind grading, now common at U.S. law schools,
so that students already known by professors or from esteemed families would have
no advantage over others. Wikipedia website,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChristopherColumbusLangdell (last visited Oct. 5,
2009).
increased. The presence of claimants' representatives added life to
decisions on appeal which in the 1950s and 1960s would have been
accepted without any appeal.
The adversarial system, employing advocates on both sides of the
jurisprudential equation and placing the judge in his or her traditional
role as a neutral decision-maker has been employed in many state
workers compensation systems. For example, Oklahoma utilizes just
such a system and provides for a "Joint Petition" to resolve the claim
once an agreement is reached between the company lawyer and the
claimant's lawyer.'0 ' No full formal hearing is held though the judge
101. See R. OKLA. WORKERS COMP. CT., tit. 85, ch. 4, § 55, available at
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=451284,
which provides:
A. 1. A record of the terms and conditions of an approved Joint
Petition settlement and the claimant's understanding concerning
the effect of the settlement must be made and transcribed at the
respondent's expense.
2. In no instance shall the total attorney's fee amount exceed the
maximum attorney's fee allowable by law.
3. A file-stamped copy of an approved Joint Petition settlement
shall be mailed by the Court to all unrepresented parties and
attorneys of record.
B. No settlement of a claim on Joint Petition shall be made upon
written interrogatory or deposition except in cases where the
claimant is currently engaged in the military service of the United
States, is outside of the state, is a nonresident of Oklahoma, or in
cases of extreme circumstances.
C. No Joint Petition settlement may be presented until competent
medical evidence is ready for admission.
D. The transcript of the Joint Petition settlement shall be
prepared and provided to the parties within ninety (90) days. If
any respondent or insurance carrier prefers to be billed
immediately for the transcript, it may request the court reporter to
determine the charge at the time the record is made. The court
reporter may then contract for services rendered and submit a
statement in conformity with the agreement.
E. Medical reports and other exhibits submitted in support of a
Joint Petition settlement will not be transcribed unless the parties
request otherwise. When said reports or exhibits are not
transcribed, the original exhibits or duplicate copies thereof shall
be affixed to the original transcript and placed in the Court file.
F. Joint Petition settlements between the claimant and the
respondent shall not be deemed an adjudication of the rights
between the medical provider and the employer as to charges
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approves the final "JP" usually after a statement made on the record.
The system works, is not backlogged, and while it has produced
anecdotal tales of claimant's doctors versus company doctors, no
such pitfall awaits in the Social Security venue where only public
benefits are at issue.
Finally, the presence of adversarial counsel establishes balance in
a way not possible with the current Three-Hatted Social Security
administrative law judge who cannot, by virtue of his or her position
as a neutral, negotiate with claimant's counsel. Indeed, a ready
resource of attorneys able to serve as Government counsel currently
exists within ODAR offices nationwide.'0 2 Senior attorneys have
been tasked in various roles in the effort to reduce the backlog. They
incurred by the medical provider prior to the date of the Joint
Petition settlement.
G. Within seven (7) days of the date a medical provider provides
initial treatment for a work-related accident, the medical provider
shall provide notice in writing to the Workers' Compensation
Court (but only if a Form 3, 3A or 3B has been filed with the
Court) and in all cases shall provide notice in writing to the
patient's employer, and if known, the employer's insurance
carrier. If the medical provider fails to provide the required
notification, the medical provider forfeits any rights to future
notification, including those circumstances where a case is joint
petitioned, unless said medical provider is actually known to the
respondent or is listed by the claimant.
H. At the time of the joint petition, the claimant shall provide to
the respondent a list of all medical providers of which the
claimant is aware. Within ten (10) days from the date the joint
petition is file-stamped by the Court, the respondent shall send
notice of the joint petition to all medical providers listed by the
claimant, to all medical providers providing written notice to the
employer and, if known, the employer's insurance carrier, and to
any other medical providers known to the respondent.
I. Once a joint petition is filed, the claimant is responsible for
payment of any future medical benefits, and informing any future
medical providers that the case has been joint petitioned, and that
the respondent shall not be responsible for payment of said
medical bills.
102. The Social Security Administration employs attorneys both within the
agency generally and within ODAR specifically. See Social Security
Administration website, "Legal Careers,"
http://www.ssa.gov/careers/legalcareers.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). Both staff
attorneys and attorney advisors are employed within ODAR.
have been given in some instances the ability to sign and thereby
implement fully favorable decisions - decisions made by review of
the evidence absent a hearing.'0 3  It would be a relatively
straightforward transition to move these personnel into separate
facilities, no longer associated with the judges, but instead to function
as Government attorney/representatives able to negotiate with
claimants' counsel, in effect expanding their current role. One can
even envision a possible career path which finds attorneys serving for
a period as staff attorneys at ODAR before moving over to the more
independent role as Government attorney/representatives. 0 4
Finally, in answer to those who would say the presence of
Government counsel in disability appeals hearings is in some form or
fashion unseemly, subjecting potentially ill or disabled persons to
cross-examination by opposing counsel, two points come to mind.
First, under current jurisprudential doctrine the judge is charged in an
inquisitorial role. In such role he or she routinely questions the
claimant. How much more intimidating is the experience when
conducted by a judge replete with black robe, from the bench? Better
still to be conducted by counsel, subordinate to the direction of an
otherwise neutral and passive jurist. Second, and perhaps of
paramount import, is the conception of the role of a Government
attorney/representative. His or her task is not to win or beat the
claimant or claimant attorney/representative. Instead, as a
representative of the people - the public - he or she is charged with a
higher calling, and it is this charge which imbues his or her role both
within and outside the hearing and in all contact and communication
with opposing counsel and claimants. The Government attorney is
charged to do what is right - to seek the right result - whether it be a
determination that the claimant is, or is not disabled.
103. See, e.g., Initiatives to Eliminate the Social Security Administration
Hearing Backlog, Status as of June 27, 2008, 1, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/BacklogStatus07l808.pdf.
104. Critically, however, these new actors in the system cannot be subject to
the unfettered direction of the SSA, as they were in Salling. Instead, some barrier
must be erected to ensure that only truly meritorious appeals be taken of otherwise
favorable decisions. Imbuing these new players with the same ethical mandate
paced upon members of the Department of Justice or District Attorney's office is
an appropriate starting point - their role is to seek justice - a right result - and not
simply win.
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Recognizing this calling, the Government attorney should not be
feared or thought somehow an inappropriate actor in the
jurisprudential equation.'0 5 Instead, he or she should be embraced as
a welcome balance, restoring to each actor within the equation a
discernable, predictable role, not muddied by now-antiquated notions
that somehow the claimant must be protected as he or she makes her
way through the appeals process. The Supreme Court in Berger v.
United States said it best:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.'0 6
It is time, therefore, to set aside old premises and outdated
assumptions. Opposing lawyers will not prolong the life of an
105. Equally important, however, the Government attorney should not be
viewed as somehow able to bypass the administrative law judge or otherwise
engage in misconduct as was observed by the district court in Sailing v. Bowen,
source cited supra note 61. Implementation of a new jurisprudence necessarily
calls for new procedural regulations such that the perceived deficits of Sailing do
not find new life in this effort, including potential ability of the judge to impose
some form of administrative sanction on counsel who fail to comply with
appropriate judicial direction. Review of a new regulatory scheme should also
include close review of the question, whether to eliminate the Appeals Council, as
suggested by the Sailing court; and as has been suggested in various proposals over
the years. Doing so eliminates the potential for further delay occasioned by
unnecessary appeals by a government representative who lost before the
administrative law judge. Another solution: prohibit such appeals altogether
absent some form ofjudicial misconduct.
106. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
appeal. Only a small percentage of cases ever reach court in the
court system. Lawyers resolve disputes. After all, as Chief Justice
Warren Burger said at the 1983 ABA Mid-Year Meeting:
The entire legal profession-lawyers, judges, law
teachers-has become so mesmerized with the
stimulation of the courtroom contest that we tend to
forget that we ought to be healers-healers of conflict
• . . Should lawyers not be healers? Healers, not
warriors? Healers, not procurers? Healers, not hired
guns? 10
7
It is time for a change in the Social Security disability appeals
system.
Time for a new jurisprudence.
Come senators, congressmen
Please heed the call
Don't stand in the doorway
Don't block up the hall
For he that gets hurt
Will be he who has stalled
There's a battle outside
And it is ragin'.
It'll soon shake your windows
And rattle your walls
For the times they are a-changin'.
Bob Dylan, "The Times They Are a Changin " 3rd Stanza.
107. Chief Justice Warren Burger, speaking at the American Bar Association
Mid-Year Meeting, February 12, 1984.
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A GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE CURRENT
JURISPRUDENCE
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The multi-step process of setting a to a
case for hearing suffers from significant tDocket
delay with little opportunity for - -
claimant's representative to interact with 2 7
the decision maker short of a hearing. ote
Notices i
Under current procedures, cases are Mailed i
not assigned to a judge upon the filing of 
--7
a request for hearing. This practice-L
differs from that in the courts, where a
case is assigned immediately upon filing. 
- _
This yields a defined case load, Hearing
oftentimes enabling expedited pre-trial Held
handling - something not viable in a 
-
system where the assigned judge is 
-
unknown until the case is ready for
hearing. The procedure does not allow 
_
for significant pre-hearing interaction j ____
with claimant's representative who often Decision
has no idea who the judge is until notice Prepared
of hearing is received. Delay is endemic and Mailed
as case after case line-up for hearing.
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Claimant's representative is able to contact the government
representative at any juncture in the process and may effectively
bypass the otherwise long hearings process in favor of dispute
resolution processes which may include entry of stipulated facts and
amended onset dates with decisions routinely reached far before they
otherwise would have under the present jurisprudence where
claimants are literally forced to wait in long lines and go through
hearings, in many cases unnecessary.

